Intro to ensemble-council election systems

Against Ensembles

Stability is not rigidity: Well-balanced majorities and stable policies might seem to increase risk of continuing a policy even when it stops working. But ensemble stability comes from accurately representing the voters, not ignoring or exaggerating shifts in their opinions. A tendency to slightly exaggerate shifts might help a tradition-bound state to innovate. But if the electorate is volatile or easily herded by fads, it might be good to dampen their shifts via a long term of office, overlapping terms, or even by indirect election as of U.S. judges.

The ability to “throw the bums out” is one measure of the power voters have over their elected leaders. (Most people who advocate this want to throw out the other party's bums, not their own party's bums.) A coalition government (as in many PR legislatures) or open majority (as in many U.S. legislatures) makes this difficult. In either case, the voters might vote out one faction of reps and yet see the other coalition partners continue to rule.

Throwing out the chairperson of an ensemble is the strongest single statement for change that voters could make.

The strongest opposition to ensembles will come from professional politicians afraid of losing some of their job security. They get that in English-speaking states by gerrymandering their own single winner districts or in other places by controlling the order of names on party lists.

Plurality rule rewards a candidate only for winning first-choice votes; that means winning intense supporters. STV rewards a candidate who wins enough firsts to avoid early elimination and also many high preferences over close rivals who also has intense support; this requires some intense support but also some broad appeal.

Condorcet’s rule does not look at firsts but requires a majority of high preferences over every one of the rivals, it ignores very intense support to require a broader appeal. Any rule can elect a winner with high negatives: intensely disliked by a number of voters. Condorcet's winner is the least broadly disliked.

Some rules reward a candidate for using divisive wedge issues to breakup the opposing coalition and ads attacking minorities. Under plurality rule and majority rules such as runoff and instant runoff, a conservative candidate knows she has no chance of winning traditionally liberal voters, gays for example. She may seek favor among conservative voters by vilifying gays. (In a multi-candidate contest under plurality rule, she may even denigrate centrists. Runoff and IRV make that tactic a loser because central voters are the key to winning the final 1 against 1 runoff.)

Under Condorcet’s rule each conservative may be ranked by liberals. Many will punish a gay basher with low ranks relative to other conservatives so her gains among conservative voters may be offset by losses among liberals. This rule is not likely to reward the politics of hate. So Condorcet's rule, used by itself, would threaten many politicians who have built careers well to the left or right of center. They could continue those careers in the PR seats of “mixed member” councils, which are explained in the previous chapter.

The major candidates in a Condorcet election will be close to the political center, and to each other. That often leads to: 1) no serious policy differences to debate; 2) thus a campaign based only on celebrity and character assassination; and 3) little voter enthusiasm for any candidate. But 1) the policies are close to the center; 2) candidates who throw mud dirty themselves too; and 3) all voters are "obtainable" and valuable.