One-Winner Elections

Democracy's Tragedies

Any president elected with a plurality but not a clear majority has a weak mandate to set and enforce policies.  He or she is vulnerable to attacks from rival factions, most significantly those who do not like democracy.

Salvador Allende became president of Chile in 1970 with 36% of the vote.  That was followed in 1973 by a right-wing coup and 17 years of military dictatorship.

Bill Clinton's 1992 victory with 43% of the vote was attacked by Republicans.  Senator Bob Dole pledged to filibuster all major Democratic legislation on behalf of the 57% who voted “against” Clinton.

Abraham Lincoln became U.S. president in 1860 with less than 40% of the vote.  This gave secessionists a powerful argument to deny his authority — hastening the Civil War.

Terrible tragedies in democracy's history often were sparked by the plurality rule.  Every day it hurts millions of people through democracy's smaller disasters.

Researchers have found the simple and ancient plurality rule is the worst rule at electing the most central candidate from 3 or more candidates (refs C, M, L).  A runoff election helps only a little.

A Democratic Solution

Though a tally may be difficult, the voter's job is easy:
      Simply rank the candidates. 

For a voter, the solution to most undemocratic tragedies is as easy as 1, 2, 3; marking first choice, second choice, third choice.  That gives the vote counters enough information to use Condorcet's rule.  (Pronounced "Con door say".)

Condorcet's Rule

Linked pages will show tallies through drawings, or tables for the visually or mathematically inclined.  This non-technical page will look at the merits of electing the Condorcet winner.

Merits of Condorcet's Rule

For example, Representative Gephardt [Livingstone, Lafontaine] out ranks Clinton [Blair, Schröder] on liberals' ballots, so for a Condorcet win, Clinton would have to appeal to centrists and conservatives -- even though she cannot hope to be the first choice for conservative voters. 
Conservatives like G.H.W. Bush [Major, Kohl] out rank Clinton on conservatives' ballots, so for a Condorcet victory, Clinton must appeal to centrists and liberals.

A candidate must compete across the political spectrum -- unlike plurality winners, who need and get no votes from 1 side.  Every voter can rank her relative to other candidates.  So under Condorcet's rule all voters are "obtainable" and valuable.  Thus a rep elected by this rule must be concerned with helping a very broad constituency.  This motivation is essential for the swing rep(s) in an ensemble council.

If she appeals only to centrists, the moderate and fringe voters on all sides can give higher ranks, and the election, to someone whose appeal is wider.

Wide appeal and policy positions close to the median voter's make this the most appropriate candidate to moderate debates.

A group with several nominees does not splinter.  Its members may rank all of their nominees above other candidates.  Then each nominee gets all of that group's ballots when tested 1 against 1 with an outsider.

Finally, if another rule picks a different winner, the Condorcet winner ranks higher on most ballots and would win a majority, 1 against 1.

There is usually 1 who can top all others.  But sometimes no one passes all of her pairwise tests.  Such ties can be broken by many rules including the Instant Runoff rule described in a page below.

Critics charge that the Condorcet rule might elect politicians whose vagueness or indecision offends nobody.  That might happen after a negative, polarizing campaign which leads some voters to rank their party's major rivals below unknown candidates. Obviously those critics are exasperated by indecision and afraid of the unknown, but so are many voters.  A democrat must assist and then give credit to the judgements of voters.

Central leaders tend to be pragmatists.  Leaders further from the center are more doctrinaire and intolerant -- with sometimes disastrous consequences.  Constructive leaders of the 21st Century will be challenged to raise tolerance of religions and cultures.

In the Korean example, liberal voters could have ranked the militarist candidate below both liberals.  The liberals were nearly tied in first-choice votes (28% to 27%).  So the Condorcet winner probably would have been the liberal preferred by conservative voters.  That was the most central candidate.  The president would have had majority support over each rival.

(Note: If a chief executive is given the power to veto legislation, then her election should be closely related to that of the legislature.  Otherwise their disagreements may block essential government action.  A council elected by off-center rules usually matches best with an executive elected by Instant Runoff Voting.  A well-centered ensemble council matches an executive elected by Condorcet's rule.)

The down arrow links to a page about the preference ballots that let voters rank many candidates.  But before going deeper, please click the right arrow  to read an overview of multi-winner rules.  Later pages on central majorities and policies will give more stories about off-center governments.