Different uses for voting
need different types of voting.
Loring Allocation Rules
Some optional methods for fair-share rules are complex and some involve subtle distinctions. Please, always keep in mind that the act of voting is easy: Each voter ranks or grades most of the proposals and may give them preferred budgets, period. Voters do not need to know details of the tally rule or its foundations in theory and research. They should judge it by its results, comparing it with alternatives just as they judge most social or technical tools.
The Loring Allocation Rule (LAR) makes comparison of results routine by holding a second vote to pick the final set of winning projects from 4 or 5 sets. Some sets come from variations in the vote quota for Movable Money Votes (MMV) and the ratio of funds allocated by a centrist tally rule or a fair-share rule. But some sets of winners may be the results of other fair-share allocation rules. (Non-proportional rules may not be used because majorities often would select the non-proportional sets and keep all power rather than share it more democratically.)free riding. The Loring Allocation Rule (LAR) tries to balance these 2 tendencies.
LAR builds on the foundations of the Condorcet and STV rules, just as the Loring one-winner and ensemble rules do. Returning to an earlier case, LAR voting could control a co-operative journal, video, or Internet channel. This lets the subscriber-voters directly allocate funds for columnists, feature writers, supplement editors, and cartoonists; serials, specials, sports, and news. All subscribers get to read all items that get funded.
Some of the comics' fund is awarded by a central Condorcet Allocation Voting (CAV). The comics are ranked as first Condorcet winner, second, third and so on. The CAV part of the budget should be enough to fund several broadly-popular comics. A winner receives the median of the preferred budgets given it by voters but supporters lose no MMV weight. The rest of the budget then goes to the MMV tally.
Funding some Condorcet winners before MMV reduces the free-rider incentive. For example, Voter: “I know Calvin and Hobbes is going to win. Why should I waste part of my weight supporting it?” Pollster: “If it is sure to win, it probably will during CAV. Supporters' MMV shares won't be reduced. You probably cannot predict later winners of MMV voting. So you just need to think about rating your honest preferences.” Then software easily handles the tally, including any MMV options.
This way most popular projects win funding before FS. This majority voting tends to fund basic needs while the fair-share rule decides only which extras to buy. Free rides are not a great concern because no one gets free basics while saving money for extras. This reduces the reward for free riding and all that goes with that: bluffing, cynicism, and the under funding of those shared items.
A single ballot serves both CAV and MMV tallies because both rules ask voters to give first preference to the most cost-effective option, 2nd to the 2nd most cost-effective and so on.
(CAV might be replaced by MMV with a very high quota, perhaps over 50%. Voters who support the winners of this first tally would be charged less than the full costs of the winning items. With the threshold for winning over 50%, a bare majority cannot spend this money by itself. They must gain the assent of others. But a small minority might have less influence than they do with CAV.)
How many people should be required to back a project paid for with public funds? In setting quota, consider the shares of votes in current interest groups. Even a quota of 50% cannot make MMV a pure majority rule; because each voter has a share of money, the majority cannot have it all. But a high quota can leave much of a minority's money unspent, useless.
CAV has some of the same as problems as old rules: lack of strict accountability on each rep for her spending, and lack of incentive toward efficiency.
Notes: An organization whose charter, constitution, or by-laws require majority support for allocations can use CAV and include &lddquo;Fund no more” on the ballot. An item that does not win a majority over &lddquo;Fund no more” will not be funded.
Some groups choose to vary their tally rule from time to time. They might use the full fund for CAV one year and MMV the next.
The Schulze method and Tideman's Ranked Pairs each create a ranked list of winners. So they are good rules to use for CAV. To get this power, the voter must rank almost all of the proposals. That will be true for any rule that lets minority interest groups help select items favored by majorities.
The tally software may create 4 or 5 sets of winners. Each set would use a different ratio of central CAV to distributed MMV funds and size(s) of quota. All sets would include some items funded by minority ballots. Voters would have the final choice in a Condorcet tally selecting the most popular set.
But Condorcet is a majority rule and those have often failed to protect minority rights. So the minority's right to discretionary funds must be protected in the by-laws by setting a minimum amount for the MMV share of funds and an upper limit on quota.
A group with few people or little money might decide to allocate half or more by a central rule. But a city would probably allocate most discretionary funds by a fair-share rule.
Table 3 compares 2 sets of winners by listing each winner's budget times the number of voters who ranked it as a first or second choice.
Evaluations of Ballots with Scoresas Used on the Advanced Ballot
Utility1 Sum for all ballots: contribution to winner × ballot's score for it. No utility added for items which ballot did not contribute to.
Equity: 2 graphs for each set of winning projects:
Equity number # 1: difference between a (straight line minus the Lorenz curve scores) / number of voters.
Equity number # 2: Subtract the utility scores of the 5 poorest ballots from the 5 highest-winning ballots of set 1. Compare that with the differences in sets 2, 3, 4, and 5.
Equity number # 3: sum the 5 largest unspent accounts.
The fundamental qualities of LAR come from 2 works of genius: the Condorcet and STV rules. Although the new rule is untried, its building blocks are the 2 most highly-regarded voting rules. The key question is not whether LAR will work, but whether a group dares to give some spending power to minorities.
Most groups need budget-setting rules only once a year. The Fair-share Spending and Loring Allocation Rules can handle these difficult decisions with efficiency and fairness, producing stable, high-value results.
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USA Needs FS
PB Needs FS