_DEMOCRACY EVOLVES!_
Humor: Who said, "He is a barbarian and thinks the customs of his tribe are the laws of nature."
1) Mark Twain 2) G. Bernard Shaw 3) Pat Robertson or 4) Newt Gingrich ?
On This Page: Women and PR, Political Sim Game, Loring Ensemble Rules, Condorcet's Rule, STV in Pictures. At This Site: Details on Multi-winner Elections and Group Decisions, Q & A Game, Site Outline, Download "Site.ZIP".
B In North Carolina, the plurality rules have effectively denied representation to African-Americans. They were a 20 to 40% minority in 8 voting districts before 1992. Yet for 100 years they won no federal representation. In the absence of fair representation many felt invisible as voters.
C The Pacific Northwest has been ripped apart for 20 years by repeated reversals of environmental laws. Hasty logging in times of low regulation has laid waste to resources. Periodic cutting bans have bankrupted workers and small businesses. The political pendulum swings, cutting down forests and species, then families and communities. Governments and businesses lose wealth every time a legislature changes hands and changes laws. These upheavals are a major reason some campaigns are fought like wars.
The three tragedies above were caused by the most common voting systems, used by nations and towns, co-ops and corporate boards. This web site contains improvements for democracy at all steps from primaries to policies and at all sizes from clubs to IGOÕs. The site includes pages explaining the best rules for:
Single-Winner Elections: Pick a chairperson, mayor, or president.
Multi-Winner Elections: Fill a board of directors, sub-committee, or legislature.
Policy Decisions: Enact one out of many proposed options.
Budget Setting: Adjust up or down each of the many ongoing budgets.
Project Selection: Select and budget several winners from many proposals.
Our defective voting rules come from the failure to realize there are different types of election which require different methods of voting. "We try to carry over to more complicated situations a method which is only suitable in deciding the simplest sort of issue, that is, whether a question with only 2 possible answers shall be answered 'yes' or 'no'." "For such an issue a simple majority election is, of course, sufficient."
As soon as 3 candidates present themselves for a single office (or 3 answers to a single question) the situation becomes more complicated and a simple yes-no vote is no longer suitable.
When what we want is not a single officer or decision among alternatives, but a council fit to represent the voters, something quite different is required. What is needed is not a system of dividing the voters into winners and losers but a system of condensing them in the right proportions into their chosen leaders.
1800s = Winner-Take-All Districts = Off-Center Council
1900s = Fair-Share Representation = Off-Center Majority
2000s = Ensemble Council = Broad, Centered Majority
.
We can solve that by asking each voter to rank the candidates. For a voter the solution is as easy as saying 1st, 2nd, 3rd. Whoever gets the top rank on half of the ballots wins. If no one gets 50% of the top ranks, the weakest 1 is eliminated; that is, the candidate with the fewest firsts is crossed off all ballots. Any ballot where that candidate ranked 1st now goes to the candidate which the voter ranked 2nd -- probably someone with similar views and more popularity. These transfers let voters condense into large groups supporting the strongest candidates. Ballots are counted again to see if any candidate gets half of the current top ranks. This way of voting, called Single Transferable Vote or STV, has been used in Australian elections since 1910. In the Korean example, ballots for the weaker liberal could have transferred to elect the stronger one.
B The second most common problem in an election rule is electing representatives only for the largest group.
We can solve that by using STV again but now requiring less than half of the top ranks for winning a seat on the council. To win 1 of 5 seats requires the top rank on only one-fifth of the ballots or 20%. An interest group with 20% of the voters will win 1 seat and only 1, no matter how many extra candidates they start with. A group with 60% of the voters will win 3 seats. That is their fair share and their Proportional Representation (PR). If a candidate gets more than enough votes, a share of the extra votes goes to each supporter's next choice. This system is used by Australia, Ireland, and Cambridge Massachusetts. In North Carolina, 3 districts each with 4 reps could elect 2 black reps. STV will be explained through pictures below.
C The third common problem is electing a council with an off-center majority. That leads to off-center policies.
To solve that, a council's decisive swing vote should not belong to the left or the right. It should go to a chairperson elected by a rule that always finds the most central candidate. We might use STV with a 50% requirement again but there is a more broadly-central method called Condorcet's rule. It uses the same preference-rank ballots as STV. Condorcet's rule elects the 1 candidate who can top each of the others, 1 on 1. If most voters prefer (rank) A over B, A passes that test. Each ballot's rank of A relative to B concerns us; the number of firsts is not important. The winner is tested with C.
The following example shows 7 voters choosing 1 winner from 4 candidates. Table I lists ballots from the 7 voters. Table II tests the 4 candidates; each cell records 1 side of a 1 on 1 test. Its number tells how many voters preferred the name in a column heading over the name in a row heading. For example, 2 voters ranked A higher than B on their ballots, 5 ranked B above A. Passing a test requires winning at least 4 of the 7 ballots. In the 6 tests, ballot 1 counted for: A in A versus B, C, or D; for D against B or C; and for C against B.
.
C can top any rival so C wins. (Who wins by plurality or STV?)
A group with several candidates does not splinter. Its members may rank all of their nominees above other candidates. Then each nominee gets all of their ballots when tested against outsiders. Finally, if another rule picks a different winner, the Condorcet winner can top her 1 against 1. There is almost always one who can top all others. But if no one passes all of her majority tests, the Loring One-winner Rule (LOR) breaks the tie using STV.
Why? Because women in those nations considered starting their own parties. Under plurality rules, new parties divide the side and lead to certain defeat. But PR gives seats to a new party supported by a large minority. This reasonable threat forced the old liberal parties to decide that political experience was not as important as gender balance. They dropped some experienced men to make room for women on their lists of nominees. And they won.
Inclusive rules elect a broad variety of representatives and thus encourage a wide range of candidates and issues, and a great voter turnout -- Australians see 90% vote compared with the USA's 50%. It seems that ranking the candidates is both worthwhile and easy!
PR limits the anti-democratic effects of unequal campaign funds. In district or at-large plurality elections, 1 side can win each seat if they catch the interest of the swing voters, and costly TV ads help attract these voters. PR minimizes that. No matter how much money a party spends, it can't win all the votes and all the PR seats. So PR candidates may feel less pressure to raise campaign funds and serve donors.
If any group is excluded or expelled from a council, they are not likely to view the government or its laws as legitimate. And when a plurality-rule council includes reps for only 2/3 of the voters, its majority represents barely 1/3. So PR is essential to ensure that a council's majority represents a majority of voters.
Given good information, most people support PR. Recent examples: a) In 1993, New Zealanders voted to switch from plurality rule to PR -- despite major party opposition;
b) In Eastern Europe, South Africa, and throughout the world, two-thirds of the constitutions enacted since 1988 use PR.
Why we need new rules
from George H. Hallett Jr.
.
.
Most English-speaking nations still use plurality voting rules which produce 2 political factions. Voters get only 2 options; politics cover only a narrow range of issues and viewpoints. The largest faction (dark gray) rules the legislature. A small change in the popular vote can shift power, making laws and policies flop from side to side. It is a war of winner take all.
Most European nations now use Proportional Representation (PR). They elect several people to represent a large district. These voting rules give a party that wins 10% of the votes, 10% of the council seats. PR always gives minority groups their fair share of representation. That leads to broad representation of issues and view points. Usually there is no centrist (C) party and the 2 biggest parties refuse to work together. So the side with the most seats (dark gray and black) forms a ruling majority and laws flop from side to side.
New ensemble councils will have PR seats plus seats filled by a centrist rule. (C) Winners of a centrist rule must stand very near the middle of the electorate and its PR council. So they hold the council's decisive swing votes. PR reps compete for those swing votes by moving their proposals closer and closer to the center. This can lead to broad majorities and policies well balanced around the political middle.
Democratic Solutions
continued from page 1
A The most common problem in a vote-counting rule is too many candidates or proposals dividing a group of voters.
I 7 Ballots
Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1st A B B B C D D
2nd D A C C D C C
3rd C C A D B B A
4th B D D A A A B
II Tests of 4 Candidates
A B C D
A - 5 5 4
B 2 - 4 4
C 2 3 - 3
D 3 3 4 -
Effects of Condorcet's Rule
Condorcet's rule is better than STV or any other rule for finding the single most-central candidate. In any 1 on 1 test, the candidate with opinions closest to the most central voter usually wins a majority (the central voter plus all voters on 1 side). But if she appeals only to centrists, the moderate and fringe voters on all sides can give higher ranks, and the election, to someone whose appeal is wider. Wide appeal and policy positions close to the median voter's make this the most appropriate candidate to moderate debates. In order to win, a candidate does not need firsts but she must be a high choice for most voters.
Effects of Proportional Representation
Women usually win more seats on PR councils than on councils elected by older rules. The US and England, for example, elect about 10% female legislators by the ancient plurality rule. In contrast, the oldest democracies in Europe elect 30% women by PR rules adopted in this century.
Responsive Democracy
Responsive Democracy requires decision making that is 1) inclusive, 2) well-centered, and 3) timely.
So it needs 1) diverse reps, 2) centrist reps, and 3) balanced legislation.
1) The diverse reps form an inclusive and balanced council.
2) The centrist reps form a balance point for council majorities.
3) Condorcet's rule reduces manipulation and speeds legislation.
(All motions to amend or delay a bill are ranked at once.
This way of voting on policies is explained in enact.htm)
Balanced majorities avoid policy reversals, thus save money and maintain credibility. They favor all moderates, not just 1 side, thus increase satisfaction and reduce political wars. They show the rule of reason not of whim, thus inspire confidence in legitimate leadership. They create policies with broad appeal, thus help an organization to grow.
Electing a central chairperson does not let a central minority of voters and their reps dictate the laws. The Condorcet rule lets every voter influence which central candidate wins, and it will elect only about 1 out of 5 council members, so the PR reps may try to negotiate a donut majority with no centrists.
It is ironic that broad Proportional Representation helps a central Condorcet winner get the council's swing vote. It proves that a community's diversity can be a source of balance and moderation as well as perspective.
Many Americans are excited to learn that democracy does not have to mean winner take all, that it can lead to everyone having their fair share of representation and power. It isn't hard and it works. Please share this information with friends and associates; together you can help bring inclusive, well-balanced democracy to your organizations.
.
Below you can see a whole STV tally turning ballots into reps; 12 ballots add up to 1 rep.
36 votes / 3 seats = 12 votes for 1 seat.
Neighboring candidates have similar opinions so most voters rank them close together. But the 2 interest groups are far apart. Their positions jump from B to R.
STV Protects Majority Rights: The old plurality rule elects A, B, and S. So group I gets 2 reps for 12 voters while group II gets only 1 rep for 24 voters. That is not fair and it does not lead to majority policies. But group I gets no rep if group II gives 2 votes to R, 7 to S, 8 to T, and 7 to U. Plurality rules are erratic as well as unfair. This shows the importance of ranking candidates and transferring votes.
.
.
.
.
Click here to receive the STV tally formatted onto 1 page MS Word 4 (Macintosh).
.
Elections for research or fun may have 2 to 16 candidates, competing for 1 to 7 seats. Simulated voters rank candidates, giving 1st choice to the closest, 2nd choice to the 2nd closest, and so on. Their positions may represent geography or political opinions. Moving a candidate requires paying for ads and answering interview questions can win donations.
Simulations show LER is the best way to represent the center and all sides. Here it elects Al then Bev, Di, Fred, and Hi. A Condorcet Series elects the 5 candidates nearest the central voters: Al, Bev, Fred, GG, and Hi. No one in the lower-right corner wins so the council cannot balance around the central voter. Bloc vote and Borda's rule elect the same off-center council. The STV winners? Bev, Di, Fred, GG, and Hi. No Al! Only LER has Condorcet centering and STV balancing. Try it!
.
Answers: Humor by English playwright George Bernard Shaw.
Table I: By plurality rule B wins. By STV D wins after A and C are eliminated.
The game version of Political Sim TM has hundreds of interview questions.
Here is a sample, drawn mostly from the humorous "Authors" category.
Other pages at this web site have details on:
A) Elections: uses and effects of voting and elections, ballot design and counting, more on PR Condorcet and Ensemble rules, ways to manipulate plurality rules before and during voting, top web sites, resource groups, and readings;
B) Policy Making: why vote in meetings, ways to manipulate agenda rules, voting cycles, the Loring One-winner Rule (LOR), combining rules of order with Condorcet's rule.
C) Setting Budgets: multi-winner funding rules for ongoing departments, a Median Voter Process (MVP), Hylland and Zeckhauser's point voting.
D) Selecting Projects: multi-winner funding rules for one-time resource allocations, rules related to MVP and LER.
Click here to receive the STV tally charts formatted onto 1 page MS Word 4 (Macintosh).
Download "Site.ZIP" 122K Updated 97-03-01.
.
© 1997 Robert Loring
Reprints permitted
Comments? Questions?