4. Enacting a Policy

Enacting a policy is a type of one-winner election. We may think it would work with Instant Runoff Voting. But it is different from electing a leader to promote one side, political party or faction. Many groups seek a consensus or a central and balanced policy.

Problem 1: Groups often struggle to find the Center of opinion.



Goal 1: A Policy with Wider Appeal

A **plurality** or runoff winner gets no votes from the losing side and has little need to please those voters. But we may motivate building a policy to win support from all sides if voters can **rank** it against close rivals. This way, every voter is "obtainable" and valuable.

Then a winner is well balanced and widely popular.[2, 3] It gets a majority from voters on the **center** and **right** over any leftish policy. At the same time, voters on the **left** and **center** rank it over each right-wing policy. **All sides** rank it over narrowly-centrist policies.

A Less Rigged Agenda *Now!*

Some meetings concoct a policy by a series of yes-no choices, with or without rules of order, agendas or votes. An early proposal might have to beat each later one. An early decision might preclude some later proposals. So "**stacking the agenda**" can help or hurt a proposal.

Other meetings discuss the rival options all at once. But often, many members express **no backup choices**. So similar options split supporters and hurt each other. Then a minority pushing one option might seem to be the strongest group. Even sadder, a member with a well-balanced option but few eager supporters might drop it.

Too often, a committee chooses all the parts in a bill. Other members can say only yes or no to that **bundle**. It might include free-rider or wrecking amendments.

Rigged votes often build a bad policy and animosity. To reduce these risks, let the members rank the options.[6]

A Policy-Choice Ballot

My Rank	Option
3	Continue discussion
2	Original bill, the main motion
1	Bill with Amendment 1 (a free rider?)
8	Bill with Amend. 2 (a wrecking amend.?)
7	Bill with Amendments 1 and 2
4	Postpone to a definite time 7 days
5	Refer the bill to a committee
6	No change (a vote for gridlock exposed?)

Any "Incidental Motions" do not wait for the ballot. These include a personal complaint or request.

Condorcet Tally, CT,
the Complete Set of 1 Against 1 Runoffs

Page 12 showed the one-against-one runoff contest between the policy positions of reps M and K.
Five reps ranked M's position over K's. 5 > 4

Here are the other 1-on-1 tests within the same council.



Rep L's position tops K's by five votes to four. 5 > 4



Rep L wins the third test by six to three. 6 > 3
Her position wins majorities against each of its rivals.
This makes it the "**Condorcet winner**." L > M. L > K.

The chair's favorite could be given a final 1 against 1.
Rock < Paper < Scissors < Rock

The goal in a **Condorcet Tally** is this:

Win majority victories
over every single rival.

The winner must top every rival, **one-against-one**.

A good **analogy** is a round-robin tournament.
A player has one test with each rival, one at a time.
If she wins all her tests, she wins the tournament.

Each voting test sorts all the ballots into two piles.
If you rank option K above L, your ballot goes to K.
The option that gets the most ballots wins this test.
If one wins all its tests, it wins the Condorcet Tally.*

Why Use a Condorcet Tally (CT) for Policies

- **Choice ballots:** Rank the alternatives on one ballot so **Simplify** the rules of order, **speed up** the process and **Reduce agenda effects**, from simple errors and **gridlock**, to free-rider and wrecking amendments.
- **No split-vote** worries as duplicates don't help or hurt each other. An ad hoc majority can rank all of their favorites over the other options. Ballots from all voters help decide which one of the majority's favorites wins.
- **A balanced policy** tends to be **stable** and settled. Yet, **a balanced process** can **calm** some fears about reviewing and **changing** a good policy to improve it. This saves time and builds respect for democracy.

* It is rare but majorities can form a cycle of winners *eg* T > S, S > R, *and* R > T. **RCV** can break this unusual tie; it drops the option with the fewest top ranks.[2]



Resist Rigged Votes

In the **plurality election** on page 11 candidate M lost. Let's say her party **gerrymanders** the borders of her election district or the membership in her committee. It adds voters who like her and cuts out some who don't. In this **safe-seat** district, bluish voters can elect M or an even less central person who may **polarize** politics.[4]

But this gerrymander didn't change the **CT** winner, L. With **central** tools, policies take big swerves less often.



3 rank K>L>M. 2 rank L>M>K. 4 rank M>L>K.

Plurality gerrymanders make many **wasted votes**.[5] **CT+RCV** or **Proportional RCV** reduce those, page 21.

To buy a one-seat district that uses **CT** or **RCV**, $ponsors must **mislead** a majority, not just a plurality. And help to "**spoilers**" in a rival group fails to split it.

Foul **manipulations** of plurality rules are not rare. And point voting incites *extremist* high and low votes, as I worry, "Could my points for a low choice hurt my fave?" But a chance to rig real **RCV** or **Condorcet/RCV** is rare, risky and hard. So there's less danger of rigged votes.[2]

Other Central Voting Tools

1 **A Top-Four Primary then an RCV election** puts a focus on four big rivals. They offer more hopes, fears and plans than just two rivals in a macho duel.[5] A winner earns both **intense** and **widespread** support. This elects a strong central candidate in real elections.[4.2]

But in voting by legislators, they might propose many tempting variations of the options in policies or budgets. One goal might be to muddle the central interest groups. **RCV** factions of the **left** and **right** then might squeeze out all of the most **central options** in **early eliminations**.

Research finds the **CT+RCV** tool enacts the most central option and is in many cases the tally tool hardest to rig.[2]

Procedural tiebreakers: Continue this topic now or later. Hold a membership assembly and vote; perhaps on Polis.

CT+RCV can elect a **moderator** to a council, page 8
or an apolitical judge.
But is it likely to elect diverse reps? yes or no?
Do CEOs mostly **moderate** & balance or **advocate** & lead?
e.g. a mayor CT+RCV RCV

It can set a balanced policy, pages 29, 56,
or one plan for many ongoing budgets, page 46,
or the base number for **Fair Share Voting**, page 26.
But is it certain to spread spending fairly, yes or no?

Top4+RCV is often the best way to elect an official.
CT+RCV may be the best to set a policy or a budget plan.

Answers: No. Discuss this. No.