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Should we enact a minority policy over the objections of a majority? If so, how do we pick which minority policy to enact?
Merits of the Centre
These 6 or 7 arguments are just sketched. They do not flow from 1 to the next. Several are adapted from my web pages linked to the bottom of elect.hmt. (By the way, a revised version of Political Sim was posted there this week.) Bullets mark the key sentences.
I asked David Barnsdale to link Democracy Evolves! to his web site, which has long been one of the top 3 sites on election systems. He replied:
"An excelent page which I will at once add to mine. I disagree with you on the merits of the centre. Sometimes the centre is a messy compromise that is the worst of all worlds. eg the UK in Europe. Either the UK goes it alone or tries to make a Federal Europe. Instead we are trying to keep Europe in an unworkable transitional state."
I What or who is the centre?
¥ Are you implying that the current policy was designed and set by a centrist? That is not how it has been reported over here. We are told that your political parties are highly partisan and have powerful leaders. Any independent negotiation toward compromise with the opposition is insubordination. And John Major can dump an insubordinate Tory MP on a moor-like hustings in Scotland.
Both sides are maintaining negotiating (battle) positions. The current policy is a grudging compromise, which both sides consider temporary. Many MP's hoped it would fail even before it was enacted. ¥There is no centrist party trying to invent a good compromise, with useful EU cooperation -- yet some independence.
Perhaps the central voters do want some federation -- but not too much. Those who disagree must persuade them that total independence or total integration is best.
The Chairperson's Role(adapted from elections.hmt)
A bad compromise makes the chairperson vulnerable to defeat by someone with better ideas.
The chair person on a 3 seat council tries to center and balance each policy. She participates in the discussion, explains the option she prefers and asks the 2 reps to move closer to it. The winner is the one who moves closest to the chairÕs balanced view. This is not a one-sided victory. It gives only slightly more to 1 side than to the other.
It seems to me that moderate and fringe leaders tend to be ideological and doctrinaire whereas central leaders tend to be pragmatic.
II What is compromise?
An argument from my site's second page, elections.hmt.
Here are two views on the pur pose of electing decision makers: A)Ê"An election should give representation to the range of opinions in the electorate. Give them a forum to debate and refine policies for the common good." This view emphasizes the integrating purpose of elections and representative committees.
B)Ê"The goal of an election is to give one group the power to rule. Give them a clear man date to resolve neces sary choices." We could call that the dominance purpose of an election.
¥ This view risks turning to dictator ship: If the biggest party should domi n ate a government, should the biggest subgroup control the big gest party? And should the biggest sub- subgroup...
1 side
1 party
1 faction
1 leader
Compromises must be made at some level, even if that is in the mind of 1 person. Even single-party states have many compromise policies although the process is hidden. The current EU plan for federation is a system of compromises. Democrats hold that political decisions are better when many minds work together, when the options are debated in public from many points of view, and when power is distributed fairly. Compromise is inherent in power sharing by 2 people or 2 billion.
¥ We need mediators and voting rules chosen for their ability to avoid blocking maneuvers and to find the best positive compromises.
My site argues that inclusive decisions can be more stable. They continue democracyÕs evolution toward wider participation in power.
III The "no change" option
Would you argue for removing "no change" from the ballots for voters or legislators, offering them only "go it alone" or "federation"? The Enact.hmt page on legislative voting suggests that parliamentary motions for delay may be removed by a majority. But the "no change" option should not be so easily removed. That vote would put 1 option, the status quo, against all others. Besides, a motion for insignificant change could take the place of "no change".
IV Stability is Not Rigidity, adapted from enact.hmt
Well-balanced majorities and stable policies might seem to increase the danger of staying stuck on a policy even when it stops working. But LER's stability comes from accurately representing the voters, not ignoring them. If they shift, the council and policies should also shift.
A dictator's decision making is quick -- but who dares to give feedback for improving it. Elite corporate executives do get feedback from market polls -- but use it to manipulate public perceptions and maximize short-term profits for shareholders. Democracy can be an honest and accurate feedback system. Information from the lowest-level elements, the voters, can change the most powerful office holder and even change the rules of the system.
Policy flip flops give new programs a chance to be tried, but only briefly. And anecdotes about haphazard changes are not as useful as deliberate policy experiments. A balanced council should let each side test its program on the issue or constituency area where it has its strongest support.
V Problem 1, Flip flops
A shift to Labor as the ruling majority may reverse England's EU policy. Could a new Thatcher reverse that reversal? Would that be a good pattern? Veering back and forth often is not the best way to steer my car... or the ship of state.
VI Problem 2, The flavor of politics
Doctrinaire protagonists and the likelihood of flips and flops make a campaign into a drama with 2 caricatures in a game of chance. Good management in corporations and non-profits appears and is more reasonable.
VII Voting
How to find the most popular policy?
Condorcet's rule does not limit voters to positions along a single, continuous dimension. He knew that a voter's preference order might not be linear. A, C, B and C, A, B are as valid as A, B, C and C, B, A. He found that even when all individual preferences are linear, their collective preferences might not be.
As you point out, it may be reasonable for some voters to rank the current policies below both federation and going it alone. All 3 options (plus better compromises) certainly should be debated and offered on the ballots for voters and legislators. The option that a majority of voters agree is best would win Condorcet votes for the chair and for legislation.
¥ Strategic voting seems the most pernicious reason a satisfying solution cannot be found. Lets say I sincerely rank going it alone 1st, federation 2nd, and a long transition or trial period 3rd. If I give 2nd to federation, it may win and an independent England is lost for the rest of my lifetime. So I give 2nd to transition, in hopes of keeping alive a chance for full independence, even if it does not yet win. Voters favoring federation mirror my strategy. With these strategic seconds AND some sincere fence-sitters' firsts, the unworkable fence-sitting transitional state can win by Condorcet's rule. This stalemate can continue until some voters on 1 side or in the centre decide it is hurting them (or everyone) too much. Unfortunately those may be the voters who are least selfish and who care most about England.
Adding more options and shades of opinion makes this less likely. Perhaps that indicates a referendum using LOR. But even that is subject to strategic voting, of course, because there are no perfect rules. Logic and probability seem to show LOR most resistant to strategic voting.
VIII
Perhaps we should not expect to change anyone's opinion on the merits of compromise. Such opinions may be closely linked to one's wish for kings versus equality, authority versus power sharing, and certainty versus openness. Frank Sulloway reports in "Born to Rebel" that this is a trait set early in life.