

Condorcet -
Single Transferable Vote

**The Least Manipulable Rule
for Electing the Candidate
Whose Support is Broadest**

Robert B. Loring

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Computer spreadsheets to calculate C-STV are available for \$5. (US) from the author. Please specify MS-DOS or Macintosh disk format.

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