Other Policy Rules其他政策规则

Consensus 共识

Is consensus inclusive, well-centered and decisive?共识包容性，以及为中心的和决定性的？ It may not feel inclusive to shy or timid people, busy people, or easy-going people.它可能不会觉得包容性，以低于或胆小的人，忙碌的人，或随和的人。 It is not well centered when manipulated by a "squeaky wheel", a person who persistently demands more than 1 share of attention.这是没有得到很好的中心时，所操纵的“做得车轮” ，一个人谁坚持要求超过1份额的注意。 It often seems interminable and indecisive.它似乎往往冗长和优柔寡断。

Declared Strategy Voting 宣布投票策略

Johnsrud matrix Johnsrud矩阵

Market-Based Policy Setting 以市场为基础的策略设置

But in practice it leads to oligarchy , which is economically inefficient and ethically corrupt.但在实践中导致寡头统治 ，这是经济效率低下和道德上的腐败。 An oligarchy lets those who control most of the discretionary wealth, control most of the group's decisions, which helps them get more wealth.一个寡头让那些谁控制了大部分的自由裁量的财富，控制着大部分组的决定，这有助于他们获得更多的财富。 Resources that do not command wealth, including poor people, are badly used.资源不丰富的命令，其中包括穷人，有不同程度的使用。

Together with the availability of money, the need for money also affects the willingness to pay and varies from person to person even at communes, where everyone has the same income.连同提供的资金， 需要资金也影响到愿意支付和因人而异，即使在社区，在那里每个人都有相同的收入。 One person may need to buy health care or visit a relative.一个人可能需要购买保健或访问一个相对的。 We cannot assume that even one individual has a constant utility for money.我们不能承担，即使是一个人具有恒定公用事业为了钱。 Someone may have an emergency which uses up savings -- leaving them with no political power so decisions will be taken with no measure of their concerns or needs.有人可能有紧急使用了储蓄-让他们没有任何政治权力，决定将采取的任何措施的关注或需要。

In theory market rules are less coercive than majority rule because winners pay only want they agreed to pay and losers may receive compensation.从理论上讲市场规则不太胁迫比多数人统治，因为获奖者只支付希望他们同意支付和失败者可能得到赔偿。 But an interest group that is repeated threatened by legislation might have to repeatedly pay to protect itself.但是，一个利益集团是一再威胁立法可能不得不一再支付保护自己。

Bidding rules to make political decisions by market methods give a vote to every dollar rather than a vote to every voter.投标规则作出的政治决定的市场方法，让每一分钱投票表决，而不是每一个选民。

Insurance 保险

Some rules for a political market let voters buy insurance against policy options they don't like.一些规则的一个政治市场让选民对购买保险的政策选择，他们不喜欢。 The option with the smallest payout wins.选择与最小支付获胜。 The government collects insurance payments from all voters, then pays the losers' claims.政府收取保险费由所有选民，然后支付失败者索赔。 Losers get paid enough to compensate for the new policy and winners pay what they felt they would gain.失败者得到报酬，足以弥补了新的政策和获奖者支付他们认为他们将获得。

Demand-Revealing Process 需求揭示过程

How to deter him from offering more than he sincerely thinks an alternative is worth?如何阻止他提供超过他真诚地认为，另一种是值得？ If removing his offers changes the winner from A to B, he must pay a tax equal to the amount by which B now beats A. That is the utility value other voters lost because his vote pushed the decision to A.如果除去他提供了改变比赛从A到B ，他必须缴纳的税款的数额相等，其中乙拍答：现在这是其他选民的实用价值，因为他失去了投票的决定，推动答：

The voter's tax cannot exceed his offer for the winner.选民税不能超过其提供的赢家。 In small groups, his tax usually will be substantially less than his offer.在小群体中，他的减税通常将大大低于他的提议。 In large groups, he is likely to pay no tax because the margin of victory is much larger than any one voter's offer.在大型团体，他很可能无须缴纳税款保证金的，因为胜利是远远大于任何一个选民的报价。

This tax must be wasted or given to a politically neutral expense to avoid adding value to paying the tax for some voters or subtracting value for other voters.这必须是浪费税或给予一个政治上中立的费用，以避免增加价值缴纳税减去一些选民或其他选民的价值。

Criticisms 批评

Critics say the tax might not give many voters economic and political pains big enough and often enough to make its threat seem real.批评人士说，税收可能不会使许多选民的经济和政治的痛苦足够大，而且往往不足以使似乎真正的威胁。

The rules for voters might prevent a one from offering more money on a series of decisions than he has credit to pay, even though he is very unlikely to win them all and pay his full offer on each.规则的选民可能会阻止一个从提供更多的资金进行了一系列的决定不是他信用卡支付的，尽管他是很难赢得他们，并支付他提供充分的每个。 Such a rule would limit poor voters severely.这种规则将限制穷人选民严重。

To avoid the unequal need for money, a rule can give each voter a number of points to use for paying taxes.为了避免不平等需要钱，一个规则可以让每一个选民的若干要点用于纳税。 But artificial points do not measure the real market values of alternative policies.但人工点不衡量真正的市场价值的替代政策。 So the voting rule loses its primary benefit.因此，投票规则失去其主要受益。

Hours of community service is another way to try for political equality. 小时的社区服务是另一种方式，试图为政治上的平等。 But this would disenfranchise lawyers and doctors who work long hours or poor people who work two jobs.但是，这将剥夺律师和医生谁长时间工作或工作穷人谁两个职位。 The idle poor and the idle rich would rule.闲置穷人和富人将闲置的规则。

The system easily could lead to a minority surprise by a small group using all its money or points to seize control of one issue.该系统很容易会导致少数人感到意外由一小群利用其所有金钱或控制点，抓住一个问题。

Daring conspirators could defeat the rule by making huge offers which would give their favorite an enormous margin of victory, far greater than any one offer -- if their rivals don't use the same strategy.大胆的阴谋可能有损法治的决策提供了巨大的这将使他们最喜欢的一个巨大的胜差，远远大于任何一个提供-如果他们的对手不使用同样的策略。

The insurance and demand-revealing methods are not adapted to use by representatives.保险和需求揭示方法是不适合使用的代表。 So they require direct democracy and its inherent costs in days of study and calculation by all voters.因此，他们需要直接民主和其固有的成本在两天的研究和计算的所有选民。

Bargaining systems which require "near unanimity", become unworkable in large groups with some self-interested voters because, “[I]ndividuals holding out for more favorable treatment could be expected to block almost all action.” Nicolaus Tideman, " Voting and the Revelation of Preferences for Public Activities"谈判制度，要求“几乎一致” ，成为不可行的大型团体与一些自我感兴趣的选民，因为“ [一] ndividuals举行了更为有利的待遇预期可阻止几乎所有行动。 ” Nicolaus的泰德曼，他说： “投票和启示优惠的公共活动“

The bargaining system by Ferejohn, Forsythe and Noll (1979) reduces the costs of bargaining but works only for discrete, semi -public goods from which some of the public can be excluded.讨价还价的系统费内，福赛斯和诺尔（ 1979年）降低成本的谈判，但只适用于离散， 半公共物品，一些市民可以将其排除在外。 Only those willing to pay are allowed to control and use the public good -- even if there is little or added cost for letting others enjoy it.只有那些愿意支付允许控制和使用的公共利益-即使有很少或增加的成本让他人享受。

Community groups often weigh an individual's vote (or voice) based on 1) contributions sacrificed to the group and 2) requested influence tradeoffs which may result from 3) bargains with other voters.社会团体往往权衡个人的投票（或语音）根据1 ）捐款牺牲集团和2 ）要求的影响权衡可能导致3 ）交易与其他选民。 Elements of those principles appear in some formal voting rules: 1) demand revealing process, 2) influence points, and 3) bargaining systems.这些原则的内容出现在一些正式的投票规则： 1 ）需求揭示的过程， 2 ）的影响点，和3 ）谈判制度。

A super majority rule is often used for changing an organization's by-laws (or a government's constitution) but not for detailed policies.超级多数人统治通常用于改变一个组织的法规（或政府的宪法） ，但没有提供详细的政策。 That's because the by-laws set the ground rules for making all other decisions, so changing that changes the basis under which people joined the organization.这是因为按法律规定的基本规则使所有其他的决定，因此改变这种变化的基础上根据该人加入了该组织。

A multi-candidate decision cannot require winning 2/3 over each rival because some rivals may be very similar.多候选人的决定不能要求获得2 / 3的每一个对手，因为对手可能是一些非常相似。 But a winner must get 2/3 over the status quo.但是，胜利者必须得到2 / 3的现状。 Condorcet and IRV let us compare the overall winner with the status quo in that way.孔和通气，让我们比较总冠军现状的方法。 Approval, Borda and the other methods here cannot.批准，博尔达和这里的其他方法不能。

One country, Switzerland, and many organizations give voters the power to block some legislative decisions, often involving increased taxes or dues.一个国家，瑞士和许多组织提供选民的权力，阻止某些立法决策，往往涉及税收或增加会费。 The vote to override usually requires only a majority but could require two-thirds of the electorate.表决推翻通常只需要过半数，但可能需要三分之二的选民。 (It is worth noting that Swiss voters choose to pay for a high-quality government.) （值得注意的是，瑞士选民选择以支付高品质的政府。 ）

The chapter on electing a central chairperson has 3 sections pertinent to all elections.一章选举中央主席有3个章节有关的一切选举。 You might want to review ballots and strategies .您可能需要审查选票和战略 。