Accurate Democracy 准确的民主 | Election Systems. 选举制度 。 Central Chairperson. 中央主席 。 Voting Scams. 投票欺诈 。 print. translate. 打印 。转化。 |
| Manipulation of Elections操纵选举 | |

| This page deals only with the manipulation of voting rules.本页面只涉及操纵表决规则。 It does not look at manipulation of news events or control of news corporations, funding or truthfulness of campaign ads, intimidation or buying of voters, and tampering with ballot boxes or voting machines.它不看操纵新闻事件或控制的新闻公司,资金或真实性竞选广告,恐吓或收买选民,篡改投票箱或投票机。 Those can block democracy regardless of voting rules.这些可以阻止民主不论表决规则。 Yet rules that offer few opportunities for rule manipulation improve the chances of democratic results.然而,规则,提供机会不多规则操纵的机会,提高民主的结果。 What's wrong with the common election rules?有什么不好的共同选举规则? For one thing, they are inherently erratic in their results and that is closely related to some types of manipulation.一方面,他们本质上是不稳定的结果,是密切相关的某些类型的操作。 Each voter gets one vote under the simplest plurality rule, or a number of votes equal to the number of seats to be filled under the bloc vote rule.每名选民被一票的简单多数规则,或者得票最多的数量相等的席位有待填补根据欧盟投票规则。 The candidates that get the most votes win.的候选人获得多数选票获胜。 | This usually elects people to represent the plurality or largest group.这通常选举人民代表的多元性或最大的群体。 (Two other plurality rules are also erratic, but semi-proportional; they often elect a few minority reps. Limited vote gives each voter fewer votes than the number of seats. Cumulative vote lets each voter give more than one vote to the same candidate.) (其他两个多元化规则也飘忽不定,但半比例;他们往往选择一些少数民族代表。 有限公司表决使每个选民票比更少的议席数目。 累积让每个选民投票给一个以上的选票,以相同的候选人。 ) All plurality rules reward finding opportunities to cast a deciding vote , the one vote needed to make a loser win with no votes to spare. 所有规则悬赏寻找多元化的机会,投下了决定性的一票 ,一票需要做出胜利的失败者,没有票赞成,零备件。 Votes that do not help build exactly enough support for a win are called wasted votes . Excess votes for a winner are just as useless as votes for a loser.票,不帮助建立完全足够支持,赢得被称为浪费选票 。 超额票赢家一样无用的选票,成为输家。 Neither will affect representation on the council.也不会影响到在安理会的代表性。 (What are your chances of casting a deciding vote?) (你有什么机会,投下了决定性的一票? ) |
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Manipulations Before Voting操纵表决之前Divide and Conquer: Plurality rules are erratic because the number of votes an option gets depends more on the number of similar options than on the number of people who support such options. 分而治之 :多元化是不稳定的,因为规则的表决票数的选择会更多地取决于对一些类似的选择,而不是一些人谁支持这样的选择。 (If voters have a choice of several liberals and one conservative, who is most likely to win?) So, encourage your rivals to nominate candidates, lots and lots of them. (如果选民有选择的若干自由派和一个保守的,谁最有可能赢? )所以,你的对手鼓励提名候选人,很多很多的人。 | Gerrymander involves drawing many one seat districts where we win with 51% and a few where they win with much more than 51%. Gerrymander涉及图纸许多地区的一个席位,我们赢得了51 %和几个在那里赢得了远远超过51 % 。 That means many of their votes are wasted.这意味着他们的许多票是一种浪费。 (Similar tactics work under the bloc vote rule.) According to the non-partisan Center for Voting and Democracy "redistricting is quite simply a process in which legislators choose their constituents before their constituents choose them." (类似的策略下的工作欧盟投票规则。 )根据非党派的中心投票和民主“的重新划分选区是很简单的过程中,立法者选择其成分在其成员中挑选。 ” Encourage rivals to nominate only one candidate so she wins with excess votes, all wasted.鼓励竞争对手提名的候选人只有一名,让她赢得了超过票,所有的浪费。 Multi-winner elections under Proportional Representation make gerrymanders much less effective.多得主选举比例代表制使gerrymanders更有效。 These rules put an end to divide and conquer.这些规则制止分而治之。 |
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Manipulations By Voters手法由选民Here's how to take advantage of multi-winner plurality rules such as bloc vote:以下是如何利用多赢得多数的规则,如欧盟表决: Start by making the list shorter. 开始的名单,从而缩短。 Cross off any candidates you don't like.两岸的任何候选人你不喜欢。 Obviously you don't want to cast a vote for one of these follies.显然,你不想投的票这些愚蠢。 Cross off candidates that seem to have very little chance.跨关闭候选人似乎很少有机会。 Any vote for them is a wasted vote because it does not help build the support required for a winner.任何投票表决是一种浪费,因为它不帮助建立所需的支持赢家。 Even your most preferred candidate should get no vote if her chance of winning is small.即使您最喜欢的候选人应该没有表决权,如果她夺冠的机会很小。 (That last strategy is called " decapitation ".) (这最后的策略是所谓的“斩首” 。 ) | Free rides : In multi-winner races, don't vote for a person (or project) who has lots of support. 免费乘车 :在多赢得比赛,不投票的人(或项目)谁拥有大量的支持。 She doesn't need yours.她不需要你。 Save your vote(s) for candidates where you can make a difference.保存您的投票(县)的考生在这里您可以有所作为。 Of course, when many people take free rides, even the best candidates can lose.当然,当许多人采取免费乘车,即使是最好的候选人可以失去的。 Yes-no ballots promote manipulation which leads to cynicism.是的,没有投票促进操纵导致玩世不恭。 |
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| Most point voting rules offer two easy strategies:最点投票规则提供了两种简单的战略: Punishing votes : Give the minimum to any candidates you don't like, or that rival and threaten your favorite. 惩治票 :给最低任何候选人你不喜欢,或者说对手和威胁您最喜欢的。 This is often true even if the rival is your second favorite.这往往是真正的竞争对手,即使是你的第二个最喜欢的。 Sometimes called "burying," t is substantially the same as "raising turkeys", giving high ranks to hopeless losers.有时被称为“埋葬” , T是大致相同“提高火鸡” ,使高晋升为无望的输家。 Exaggerations : Give the maximum allowed to the favorite candidate who seems to have a good chance of winning. 夸张 :给了允许的最大数量的最喜爱的候选人谁似乎有一个很好的机会取胜。 The chapter on legislative voting will look briefly at agenda manipulations.这一章的立法选举将在简要议程的操纵。 Another page in that chapter will explain why the hardest rule to fool is often Instant Runoff Voting, also known as Alternative Vote or Single Transferable Vote.另一个网页在这章将解释为什么最难规则欺骗往往即时径流投票,也被称为另类投票或单一可转让投票。 | These voting strategies are less effective at manipulating the Condorcet, STV, or ensemble rules explained in the following chapters.这些投票的战略则没那么有效调控所孔,超视,或合奏规则解释在以下的章节。 Most readings in the resources page will explain other serious defects in plurality rules.最读数的资源会解释其他严重缺陷的多元性规则。 Changing a voting rule may seem a risky step.改变投票规则似乎是危险的一步。 But the IRV and Condorcet rules have been tested for 100 years.但是,通气和孔规则已测试的100年。 Now computers make them easy to tally.现在的电脑使他们容易吻合。 The greater risk is continuing to use ancient rules that make democracy work poorly.更大的风险是继续使用古老的规则,民主的工作很糟糕。 |
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