Other One-Winner Rules另一个获奖规则

Plurality rules 多数规则 Majority rules 多数规则

Condorcet completion 孔完成 Other rules 其他规则

Plurality Rules多数规则

Single-vote plurality is the oldest and most often used voting system.  Each voter gets a single vote which he can give to one candidate.  The candidate who gets the most votes, a plurality, wins.  In multi-candidate races the winner often gets less than a majority, less than 50% of the votes.  It is often called first-past-the-post (FPTP). 单票多数是最古老和最经常使用的投票制度。每名选民获得一票，他可以给一名候选人。候选人谁得票最多，多元化，获胜。在多场比赛获胜的候选人往往会不到多数，低于50 ％的选票。它通常被称为第一多数票当选（ FPTP ） 。

Approval voting was first promoted in the 1970's.  It has since been adopted by several professional societies in the United States.第一次表决结果批准了1970年推动的。它一直通过一些专业社团在美国。 It lets a voter give one vote to each candidate.  Brams (1979) suggests each voter cast an approval for one of the top two candidates and as many minor candidates as he rates above that one.它可以让选民一票给每个候选人。勃拉姆斯（ 1979 ）建议每名选民投了批准的一项最高的两名候选人，并为许多小的候选人，他率超过一个。 The candidate with the most approvals wins.  Note that a majority is not required.的候选人赢得多数的批准。请注意，大多数并不是必需的。 Approval Voting is most useful for making non-competitive group decisions.批准投票是最有用的决策非竞争集团的决定。 For example, there is little incentive for tactical voting when a choir votes to schedule an extra rehearsal.例如，缺少鼓励，战术表决票时，合唱团安排额外的排练。 Members briefly discuss suggested rehearsal times then raise their hands to show whether they are available as each time is offered.成员简要讨论建议排练时间然后举手表明它们是否可以作为每次提供。 A voter may raise his hand for several time slots.选民可提高他的手好时段。 The time with the most approvals wins.时间最批准获胜。

Some arguments against AV: 一些论点 ， 反对视听 ：
The fundamental problem with AV is that it forces voters to choose from several strategies: Vote for the ones you really like.最根本的问题是，它的AV部队选民们选择了几个战略：投给那些你真的很喜欢。 Vote for the ones you feel OK about.投票选举的你觉得行约。 Vote for one of the two front runner and everyone you like better than that one.投票选举的两个领跑大家你喜欢优于1 。 (The pre-election surveys strongly effect the outcome.) Voters must worry over this choice because the strategies they choose can change the results as the research below showed. Fundamentals of Voting Theory Illustrated with the 1992 Election or Why the Libertarian Party should favor Approval Voting , by Alexander Tabarrok (Dept. of Economics, Ball State University): available on-line （在选举前的调查结果强烈的影响。 ）投票者必须担心这个选择，因为他们的战略选择可以改变的研究结果显示在下面。 基础理论画报投票与选举或1992年的自由党为什么要支持审批投票 ，由Alexander Tabarrok （经济学系，州立巴尔大学） ：可在网上

“Abstract: Different voting systems can lead to different election outcomes even when voter preferences are held constant. “摘要：不同的投票系统可以导致不同的选举结果，即使选民偏好保持不变。 Using the 1992 election as an example, it is shown how the outcome of every positional vote system can be found.利用1992年选举为例，它是如何显示的结果，每一个位置投票系统可以找到。 Similarly, every possible cumulative and approval vote outcome is shown.同样的，一切可能的累积和批准投票结果显示。 Multiple voting systems, like approval voting and cumulative voting have highly disturbing properties.多次投票系统，如批准投票和累积投票已经非常令人不安的属性。 Using the 1992 election as illustration, it is shown how a candidate who wins under each of the infinite number of positional vote systems, who wins every pairwise vote (ie is the Condorcet winner), and who has the most first place and least last place votes may nevertheless lose under approval or cumulative voting.利用1992年当选为例子，它表明，候选人谁胜根据每个无限多的位置表决系统，谁胜都成对表决（即是孔冠军） ，谁拥有最第一名的地方和最不发达国家过去票仍可根据核准或失去累积投票。 Similarly, it is shown how a candidate who loses under each of the infinite number of positional systems, who loses every pairwise vote (ie is the Condorcet loser), and who has the least first place and most last place votes may nevertheless win under approval or cumulative voting.”同样，它是如何显示的候选人谁受损根据每个无限多的定位系统，谁受损每成对表决（即是孔失败者） ，谁拥有至少首先和最上第一名选票下仍可获得批准或累积投票。 “

The major site advocating approval voting: Site网站的主要倡导批准投票： 网站

The system of "counts" created by Jean-Charles de Borda in 1781 gives a candidate points for each rank voted.  A first-rank vote gives points equal to the number of candidates minus one.  A second rank gets vote gives points equal to the number of candidates minus two and so on.  The candidate who gets the most points wins.该系统的“罪状”所创造让戴高乐博尔达在1781年给出了候选点，每级军衔投票。第一级为点票的数量相等的候选人减去1 。排名获得了第二次投票给点等于候选人人数减去两个等等。候选人谁得到最点获胜。
This would elect a winner with a high &ldqou;utility value.&rdqou;  But it is easily susceptible to tactical voting.  So it has little use in political situations including most private organizations.  It often causes controversy when by judges in sports competitions. Site这将选出一个冠军高&ldqou;实用价值。 &rdqou;但容易受到战术投票。所以它已没有多大用处的政治局势，包括最私人组织。它时，往往引起争议，由法官在体育竞赛。 网站

Majority Rules多数规则

The runoff system starts with a single-vote plurality election.  The two candidates with the most votes go on to a new campaign and a one-on-one election. Instant Runoff Voting , IRV speeds the process by asking voters for ranked preferences so a runoff can be tallied without taking a second poll.  This saves money and increases turnout.  IRV usually elects the same person a runoff would; when they differ the runoff winner would lose a 1-on-1 election to the IRV winner. 径流系统启动与单票多数当选。两名候选人得票最多去到一个新的活动和一对一的选举。 即时径流投票 ，通气速度的过程，要求选民的偏好，因此排名径流可统计没有考虑第二次投票。这样可以节省资金，提高投票率。通气通常选择相同的人流量会;当他们不同的径流得主将失去一对- 1当选通气赢家。

The winner is usually the candidate who is popular with the core voters of the largest moderate party.获胜的候选人通常是谁是最受欢迎的核心选民最大的温和党。

STV3Con , STV Then Condorcet: Condorcet's rule risks electing an unknown.  If the voters are polarized, they may give first choice to a favorite, last to her main rival, and rank many candidates in between -- not thinking how bad or bizarre an unknown might be in office.  This risk could be reduced by using STV to select the [3] candidates with most first- and second-place votes, then testing them 1 against 1 to elect a winner. STV3Con ，基金会还接着孔：孔的规则选出一个未知的风险。如果选民是两极化，他们可能会首先选择一个最喜欢的，去年她的主要竞争对手，和排名之间的许多候选人-没有考虑如何坏的或未知的怪异可能是在办公室。这种风险可以减少使用超视选择[ 3 ]候选人大多数第一代和第二位的选票，然后测试它们1对1 ，选出冠军。

Unfortunately STV3 usually picks a triangle of reps, none of whom is near the center.  So a central candidate would be squeezed out by STV3 even if she is broadly (not intensely) popular.不幸的是STV3通常选一个三角形的代表，没有一个人是附近的中心。因此，中央的候选人将被挤出了STV3即使她是广泛（不紧张）受欢迎。

STV5 is more likely to pick 1 candidate near the center -- who is then sure to win the Condorcet runoff.  The winning strategy is to be the 1 most popular with the central voters.  Breadth of support is not important; so this rule more like IRV than Condorcet. STV5更有可能选择1候选人中心附近-谁是然后必胜的孔径流。获胜的战略就是要成为最流行的1与中央选民。幅宽的支持并不重要，所以这条规则更像通气比孔。

STV7 might select 2 central candidates, and the broader 1 will win the Condorcet comparisons.  But if the top 2 candidates gather 80% of the first-place votes, the other 5 selected might be political weaklings and if 1 of them wins, would she have a mandate to govern, a solid base of support, or the respect of the legislature? STV7可能选择2中央候选人，以及更广泛的1将赢得孔比较。但是，如果顶端2名候选人收集80 ％的张第一名的选票，其他5选定的可能是政治弱者，如果1人赢了，将她有一个任务管理，奠定了坚实的基础的支持，或尊重立法机关？

Perhaps a threshold rule should simply require each candidate to win 10 to 20 percent of the first-place votes in order to enter the Condorcet pairwise comparisons.  (The next chapter explains that rules for proportional representation commonly use lower thresholds because small parties are needed to create councils with full representation.)也许门槛规则应只要求每一位候选人赢得10至百分之二十张第一名选票，以输入孔成对比较。 （下一章解释说，规则的代表比例通常使用较低的门槛，因为小党需要创建理事会充分的代表性。 ）

Condorcet Completion Rules孔完成规则

The IRV page showed that in some elections more than one candidate can claim to win a majority -- the question then is who wins the strongest majorities.该通气页显示，在一些选举的候选人超过一位，可以说赢得多数票-接下来的问题是谁胜了最强的多数。

Pairwise- or Condorcet-completion rules all give the same result in most elections.  They differ only when there is no Pairwise winner due to a voting cycle such as C>B>D>C.  Each completion rule is a way to resolve a voting cycle.  These may be evaluated on their ability to resist manipulation.成对或孔完成规则都给予同样的结果在大多数选举。差别只有当没有成对得主由于具有投票权的周期，如C “乙” D “角每个完成规则是一种方法，解决了投票循环。这些可能是评价的能力，抵制操纵。

Duncan Black's 1958 rule elects the Condorcet winner if 1 exists; otherwise it elects the Borda winner.  It is the best completion rule for electing the "utility maximizing" option, if there is no manipulation.邓肯黑色的1958年选举规则，如果1孔得主存在，否则选举博尔达冠军。这是最好的完成选举规则“实用最大化”选项，如果没有人操纵。

Clyde Coombs' 1954 alternative vote, like Hare's, eliminates candidates until one gets a majority.  But it eliminates the candidate with the most last-place votes.克莱德库姆斯 ' 1954年替代表决，如兔的，消除了直到有候选人获得多数。但是，它消除了候选人最去年第一名选票。

AH Copeland's 1950 rule gives a candidate 1 point for winning a pairwise contest against another candidate and -1 for losing.历科普兰的给出了1950年第1点的候选人赢得了成对竞赛对另一位候选人和-1丧失。 (In voting cycles, Copeland often produces ties - so it does not "complete" Condorcet.) （在投票周期，科普兰往往产生关系-因此它没有“完整的”孔多。 ）

Mathematician Charles Ludwidge Dodgson (better known as author Lewis Carroll) proposed in 1876 to elect the Condorcet winner or, in the event of a cycle, the candidate who needs to change the fewest ballots to become the Condorcet winner.数学家查尔斯Ludwidge 格森 （更好地了解作者刘易斯卡罗尔）提议在1876年选举孔获得者，或在发生周期，候选谁需要改变最少的选票，成为孔赢家。

John Kemeny's 1959 system determines how many rank pairs must be exchanged (flipped) on voters' ballots to make a candidate win by Condorcet's rule.  The candidate who requires the fewest changes wins.  The Kemeny distance between two preference orders is the number of adjacent pairwise switches needed to convert one preference order to the other.约翰凯梅尼的1959年系统确定有多少排序，必须对交换（翻转）对选民的选票，使候选人获胜孔的规则。候选人谁需要最少的变化胜利。之间的距离的凯梅尼两个偏好订单是一些邻近配对开关转换需要一个倾向于以其他。

The max-min system elects the candidate with the smallest pairwise loss.  (It is not the same as Dodgson.  A candidate may lose pairwise elections to two rivals by 5% each.  Her max-min score would be -5%.  But she might have to change 10% of the ballots to become Dodgson's winner.) 马克斯民制度选举的候选人最小成对损失。 （这是不一样的格森。候选人的选举可能会失去成对的两个竞争对手的5 ％ ，每个。她的最大最小评分将-5 ％ 。但她有可能改变10 ％的选票，成为格森的赢家。 ）

Nicholas Tideman's Ranked Pairs rule creates a complete ranking of the candidates from first to last.  Their ranks come from majority preferences between options: The biggest margin of victory in the Pairwise table is locked in, say C > B.  Then the second biggest victory is locked in, say B > D.  And then the third, as long as it does not create a voting cycle.  In this case, D > C would be ignored because that would say C>B>D>C.  The rule considers a big margin of votes (and voters) more certain and forceful than a small margin. Ranked Pairs尼古拉泰德曼排双法治创建一个完整的候选人排名从去年第一次。他们的队伍来自多数偏好之间选择：最大的胜差在配对表已被锁定在说ç “湾然后是第二大胜利锁在说，乙“ D.和随后的第三，只要它不创建一个投票周期。在这种情况下， D ” C将被忽略，因为这样做会说ç “乙” D “角的规则认为，大幅度票（和选民）更加肯定和有力的比小幅。 排行双

Markus Schulze's rule is similar to Tideman's but it takes only the candidates in the voting cycle, and then drops the weakest defeats (not strongest victories) one at a time until the voting cycle is resolved.马库斯舒尔茨的规则类似泰德曼的，但只需要候选人的表决中循环，然后滴最弱的失败（没有最强的胜利）时，单次，直到投票周期得到解决。

The last two rules are most resistant to manipulation.在过去两年的规则是最耐操纵。

Other Rules其他规则

In Samuel Merrill's 1988 standard-score system, voters rate candidates on a fixed scale, say 0 to 100.  It then makes each voter's ratings average zero (some ratings become negative).  It also "normalizes" the variation within a voter's ballot.  This keeps any one voter from spreading out his ratings to influence the election more than others voters.  ["...for each voter separately, replace her ratings r _i by their statistical standard scores, ie, σ ∑ 在塞缪尔美林的1988年标准的评分系统，选民率候选人在一个固定的规模，表示0到100 。然后，让每个选民的支持率平均为零（一些收视率成为负数） 。它还“正常化”的变化在选民的选票。这让任何一个选民传播其评级影响选举的选民超过他人。 ["...分别为每个选民，取代她的收视率_r我的统计标准分数，即σ Σ

Books by Samuel Merrill and Phillip Straffin more fully explain these and less common single-winner rules.  Detailed definitions and discussions are also online at Lorrie Faith Crannor's site advocating Declared Strategy Voting rules and Blake Cretney's site for Tideman's Ranked Pairs rule and in ACE Project .  Prof. Han Dorussen includes examples with questions and answers in Rules of the Game for his course on Public Choice Theory.本书由塞缪尔美林和菲利普Straffin更充分地解释这些问题和不太常见的单得主规则。详细定义和讨论也可以在线上洛丽费Crannor的网站鼓吹申报策略投票规则和布雷克Cretney的网站泰德曼的排行双规则和费用项目 。韩教授的例子与Dorussen包括问题和答案，在游戏规则 ，他当然对公共选择理论。

Utility voting systems such as Clark's incentive revealing device or Hylland and Zeckhauser's influence point voting are not Condorcet completions rules, are easy to manipulable by "conspiracies", and are rather complicated so their ballots may confuse and burden voters.  They do not fit majority rule's one person / one vote.  Hopefully they can be adapted for groups seeking proportional outcomes for all parties but they were not designed for general elections.实用投票系统，如克拉克的奖励揭示设备或叙和泽克豪泽的影响投票点没有孔落成的规则，很容易操作的“阴谋” ，而且相当复杂，使他们的选票可能会混淆和负担选民。他们并不适合多数人统治的一个人/一票表决权。希望他们能够适应的群体寻求比例结果为所有各方，但他们并不适用于一般的选举。

A dozen plurality, majority and Condorcet voting rules have been researched by several authors to contrast and compare one-winner voting systems -- the topic of the next page.十多元，多数表决规则和孔已研究了几个作者的对比和比较一个冠军投票系统-专题的下一页。